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Abstract 
Medical decision-making has, across the history of the NHS, made a transitional 
journey from a model characterised by paternalism to one which places emphasis on 
partnership and patient autonomy. This article assesses the extent to which the 
circumstances generated by the Covid-19 pandemic affect the mode of critical care 
decision-making. It observes that clinical judgment influenced by protocols, algorithms 
and resource constraints do not lend themselves to full identification with either of the 
two frameworks familiar to the NHS. The unique mode of decision-making engendered 
can only be understood on its own terms. 
 
I. Introduction 
When the Covid-19 pandemic resulted in high hospital admission rates, concern 
understandably arose over how limited intensive care resources are to be made 
available to all patients who could potentially benefit from them. Responding to the 
urgency of the unprecedented situation, the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE), and NHS England and NHS Improvement issued guidelines1 for 
the management of critical care for adults infected with the coronavirus SAR2-CoV-2. 
Following these, intensive care decision-making is to be conducted in line with 
prescribed protocols and algorithms, whilst being “consistent with normal ethical and 
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legal frameworks”.2 However, when treatment choices are protocolised and algorithm-
based, not only is the latter difficult to achieve, it is also not possible for decision-
making to proceed solely with the individual patients’ best medical interests in 
contemplation. To the extent that this decision-making model does not fully resonate 
with the paternalistic tendencies during the early days of the NHS nor with the modern 
expectation to respect patient autonomy, its unique character needs to be, and can 
only be, understood through a pandemic-ridden resource allocation prism. 
 
II. The Doctor-Patient Relationship: From Paternalism to Partnership 
At its inception in 1948, the NHS committed itself to the provision of a comprehensive 
healthcare delivery and universal medical coverage irrespective of the ability of an 
individual patient to pay for treatment.3  While this objective has remained unchanged, 
there has since been a marked shift in the ethico-legal frameworks which govern 
medical decision-making. 
In the early days of the NHS, patients were expected, and indeed had seemed 
content, to view doctors as the sole expert in their relationship. As the party with 
esoteric medical knowledge, doctors were deemed to know what was best for their 
patients. They would unilaterally recommend a treatment strategy which they judged 
to be beneficial, and enforced that opinion on the patient.4 Medical decision-making 
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therefore revolved around the principle of beneficence, and patients played a passive, 
subordinate and dependent role within a hierarchical relationship.5 This paternalistic 
stance was also condoned by the courts through a refusal to impose liability for failures 
to redress the power imbalance by closing the information asymmetry gap. The 
judiciary made it clear that the law would not censure doctors who did not draw known 
risks to their patients’ attention when they were of a strong belief that a proposed 
treatment would benefit the patients.6 Neither would they criticise doctors who 
deliberately withheld information about risks from patients who specifically asked if 
these were present.7 Indeed it was emphasised that whether and how much 
information was divulged were matters to be decided by doctors themselves following 
a standard of practice recognised as proper by a responsible body of medical opinion 
(i.e. in accordance with the Bolam test).  
In the seven decades which have elapsed since the NHS was launched, 
profound changes have taken place in the doctor-patient relationship. Doctors are now 
expected by their professional regulator, the General Medical Council, to work in 
partnership with patients in an egalitarian non-hierarchical fashion based on 
openness, trust and good communication.8 Whilst doctors are still acknowledged as 
the expert on matters like diagnostic techniques, aetiology, prognosis and treatment 
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options that are supported by clinical guidelines, weight is today given to patients’ 
knowledge, experiences of illness, social circumstances, values, preferences and 
attitudes to risks.9 It is recognised that inasmuch as both types of knowledge are 
indispensable in the effort to effectively manage illnesses, it is important for patients 
to participate in the decision-making process. For this to take place in a meaningful 
way, the NHS requires doctors to ensure that patients are acquainted with “all the 
information about what the treatment involves, including the benefits and risks, 
whether there are reasonable alternative treatments, and what will happen if treatment 
does not go ahead”.10 Based on these, patients are to decide whether to accept any 
of the options available, and to do so even for reasons which may seem irrational to 
others or for no reason at all.11 All these signaled a shift towards an ethical and 
professional approach which not only treats them as partners, but allows them to 
assume primary decision-making responsibilities in determining the treatment option 
to follow. The courts too emphasised that “in modern law medical paternalism no 
longer rules.”12 They therefore pulled the plug on the Bolam test in respect of pre-
treatment information disclosure. Doctors can now be held negligent if they fail to 
disclose risks which a reasonable person in the patient’s position or the particular 
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patient before them, would find significant in the decision-making process, and the 
undisclosed risks subsequently materialised.13 
As can be seen, medical decision-making across the history of the NHS has 
undergone a transition from a model characterised by paternalism to one which places 
emphasis on respect for patient autonomy. The next section will explore the extent 
and manner in which resource allocation considerations generated by Covid-19 impact 
on these modes of decision-making.14  
 
III. Covid-19 and Clinical Decision-Making 
Resource allocation and decisions concerning the prioritisation of medical treatments 
are no strangers to the NHS. How resources are best utilised to achieve a 
comprehensive and universal healthcare system creates the imperative to be fair, just, 
efficient, and cost effective.15 In a public health emergency, resource considerations 
may simply extend beyond money. Factors such as hospital bed capacity (space), 
clinical workforce (people and time), equipment and treatment (commodity), and 
organisational planning may all be heavily stretched.16 The Covid-19 pandemic has 
inherently created high numbers of patients who are admitted to hospital, each with 
similar clinical needs, who are competing for access to the very same medically 
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valuable resources at the same time. Generally, patients ill with the SARS-CoV-2 
coronavirus would be triaged for clinical assessment on the severity of symptoms. 
Following this, a decision is made on whether hospitalisation is required. Dependent 
on any findings revealed by physical assessment, a clinical management plan would 
be formulated with the aim to formally diagnose, treat, and manage any potential 
deterioration in the patient’s clinical condition as the illness progresses.17 At each 
stage of the process from diagnosis to management, clinical decisions are made and 
enacted to facilitate subsequent patient recovery. Moreover, each patient requiring 
hospital treatment may present with different chronic diseases and thus would have 
varying chances of survival. Similarly, patients critically ill with the condition would vary 
in the anticipated lengths of stay on the intensive care unit should such a clinical 
intervention be warranted.  
         To mount an effective organisational response to the emergency, it is important 
that clinical protocols on how to manage the critical care of patients infected by the 
novel coronavirus are established. To this end, NICE and NHS England and NHS 
Improvement have issued guidelines which prescribe a clinical approach that places 
strong emphasis on the doctor’s assessment of two issues: the patients’ frailty, and 
their suitability to receive life-sustaining treatment. Together, the guidelines allude that 
patients with a capacity to benefit faster from intensive care, should be prioritised. 
However, as mentioned previously, they also instruct that decision-making should be 
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consistent with ethico-legal norms. But, is this fully achievable when treatment choices 
are based upon protocols and algorithms?   
It is relevant to note that although the capacity of critical care beds, ventilator 
equipment, and specialised medications are frequently in short supply even at the best 
of times, medical care and treatment still manage to keep within the partnership model 
outside a pandemic situation.18 By contrast, clinical decisions that are based on 
prescribed algorithms would inevitably place a physician’s clinical judgment over the 
patients’ autonomy. After all, decisions that are made on a case-by-case basis, as 
expected by the contemporary ethico-legal frameworks, not only risks the perception 
of clinical inconsistency, but may also threaten the fair distribution of limited resources 
during the Covid-19 pandemic.19Therefore, a return to some degree of traditional 
clinical practices based on a paradigm that adopts a paternalistic view of the doctor-
patient relationship is inexorable. However, since doctors may be compelled to triage 
patients in order to attain the utilitarian objective of benefiting the greatest number of 
patients, not only is their judgment not made on the basis of shared decision-making, 
it is also removed from sole consideration of the patients’ best medical interests as per 
the paternalistic practices of the early NHS days. This can result in some patients 
having critical care withheld from them even if they stand to benefit.20 An illustrative 
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example would be in relation to patients with co-existing chronic disease requiring life-
sustaining treatment as a result of severe lung infection. In circumstances outside 
Covid-19, such a patient might be trialed with critical care on the basis that the lung 
infection is treatable and that the intensive care treatment ought to improve the 
patient’s clinical condition somewhat.21 However, the difference with the pandemic is 
the acuity of the effect it has on existing shortages of resources and the capacity to 
deliver critical care to all who require it. In the uncertainty of how this pandemic would 
progress, it is foreseeable that critical care would be prioritised to those clinically 
judged to benefit most and quickly.22 Patients clinically anticipated to require 
prolonged courses of critical care may have this treatment option withheld especially 
in cases where it is unclear to the clinician that the benefits outweigh the risks of 
intensive therapy.23 Similarly, doctors may also withdraw treatments from patients in 
order to make way for those considered to have better chances of survival.24 Thus, 
what has emerged is a decision-making method which is neither fully reminiscent of 
the early paternalistic days of the NHS nor reflective of the contemporary concern on 
partnership and patient autonomy. To the extent that it seems to integrate a unique 
blend of “what the doctor knows best” and prescriptive clinical guidance, critical care 
decision-making in times of Covid-19 is truly unprecedented. 
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IV. Conclusion 
On the evening of 23rd March 2020, the UK government imposed lockdown restrictions 
in an effort to limit the spread of the Covid-19 global pandemic. In doing so, members 
of the public were compelled to stay at home. This was to ensure that the NHS can 
adapt to the challenges presented by the pandemic without being overwhelmed. With 
potentially large numbers of patients requiring critical care, clinical guidelines issued 
by NICE and the NHS gained prominence in the management of such patients. 
Although the use of clinical guidelines to facilitate medical decision-making is an 
established phenomenon, there are observable differences in the context of Covid-19. 
Broadly speaking, guidelines for other conditions have a more solid clinical evidence 
base and were produced over a longer time frame. By contrast, the guidelines for the 
management of Covid-19 have an evolving clinical evidence base and are synthesised 
at a fraction of the time taken for the former. The reasons for this are: the urgency of 
the public health emergency; the need to be clinically consistent in the management 
of patients with Covid-19 infection; and the imperative to maximise utility of scarce 
critical care resources.25 As a consequence, decision-making power lies far more in 
the hands of doctors than patients. For this reason, it is difficult to reconcile this 
evolving reality with the demand that critical care decision-making be made in line with 
current ethico-legal norms which revolve around autonomy and partnership. At the 
same time, it does not identify fully with the paternalistic model of the early days of the 
NHS because doctors are instructed on the likely treatment options appropriate for the 
patient’s condition. Since doctors are expected to follow guidance issued by authorities 
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such as NICE and the NHS,26 they have less scope for decision-making. Moreover, 
when doctors are commending treatment choices to their patients, they are not only 
considering the individual patient’s interests. They would also have to balance these 
against the welfare of others who are similarly ill and who are competing for the same 
resources.  
      Thus, by refracting clinical decision-making through the prism of pandemic-ridden 
resource allocation, this article has observed a mode of decision making that is neither 
fully reminiscent of the past nor an expression of present expectations. Its uniqueness 
needs to be understood on its own terms. However, with so many imponderables 
surrounding this pandemic, it is a matter of speculation how long this approach will 
need to be in place. And, would it lead to a new normal for intensive care decision-
making in general?    
 
 
26GMC, ‘Joint Statement: Supporting Doctors in the Event of a Covid-19 Epidemic in the UK’ 
(11 March 2020); Royal College of Surgeons of England, ‘Covid-19: Good Practice for 
Surgeons and Surgical Teams (31 March 2020, updated 3 April 2020), paragraph B4. 
